At last week’s EU summit, Mr Monti refused to agree to anything until Germany made a key concession. He wanted the bailout monies for the Spanish banking system not to be structured as debt of the Spanish government. In the end, Mrs Merkel gave in although this will not occur until a European banking supervisor has been established for the Eurozone banking system.
This concession is hugely significant in terms of a principle to which Germany has long held fast, in that it appears to contravene the Maastricht “no bailout” clause – recapitalising a banking system requires equity capital not debt capital. Europe will now use its emergency funds to inject new equity into the Spanish banks. This cannot be portrayed as emergency lending to fellow European sovereigns as all previous rescue loans have been. Providing equity capital to bankrupt institutions is inherently a far riskier proposition than lending to a sovereign state, and so it is impossible now to maintain the facade that German taxpayer money is not being put at risk.
As time moves on, Germany and others will find themselves facing the classic sunk cost problem – if more money is required to keep these banks afloat, then the capital provider feels under greater pressure to do so, to avoid writing off the previous investment. This is the first step down a slippery slope – the second step will come when a more rigorous and independent audit reveals that Spain’s banks require far more than the E62bn currently mooted in order to recapitalise. Next Ireland and Greece have already made clear that they want to get (retroactively) the same terms as Spain for their banking recapitalisations, and finally the Italian and French banks will be looking enviously at the cheap equity capital Spanish banks have now secured.
Mrs. Merkel does have a cooling-off period though. The principle has been conceded subject to agreement within 6 months of a new European banking supervisor. This leaves many vital areas of disagreement over details and, probably, ratification in all 27 EU states. Key areas still to be resolved are which banks fall under the direct supervision of the European regulator, what will be the role of the current national banking supervisors, and most importantly of all, who has responsibility for deposit guarantee insurance. It would seem obvious that any deposit guarantee scheme would have to fall under the auspices of the European banking regulator, but it is not clear where the money would come from. Most politicians do not wish to provide their own taxpayers money to bail out bank depositors in other countries – instead they are hoping it will be funded by the banking system itself via a Financial Transactions Tax. In the long term this may be a viable solution, but in the short term the fund would be empty for several years and the potential demands on it huge given the fragility of European banks.
One further factor which should not be ignored is that in September 2013, Mrs Merkel faces re-election. Should she concede too much to the rest of Europe over the next 12 months, she faces huge domestic political problems. There is talk that a possible way out of her dilemmas is for Germany to hold a referendum on whether it should continue to support its European partners to enable them to remain in the single currency. German public opinion is currently split on this and such a referendum would leave European financial markets paralysed until the matter was resolved.
The markets have rallied strongly on the abandonment of the Maastricht “no-bailout” clause, and the first move towards more integrated European institutions. However history suggests that there are many more late-night summits and games of brinkmanship to come while negotiating the details of what has been only agreed in principle. Investors can afford to wait and see before concluding that Europe is solving its problems.