Archives for October 2016

In the down phase of the trade deals cycle

The UK’s referendum decision to leave the EU, leaves it seeking new trade deals not only with the rest of the EU but also with the 50 or so nations with whom the EU has trade deals in place. The new minister for International Trade (Liam Fox) has also indicated that he would be keen to see trade deals with the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and China. Without trade deals, countries may impose tariffs on imports of goods and stiff regulations on imports of services.

Not only does the UK have very few experienced trade negotiators, since this has long since outsourced to the EU but the UK’s demand to make trade deals comes at a most inopportune time in the trade deals cycle. Recent events indicate the momentum and desire for agreeing trade deals have reversed.

The trade deals cycle began to turned upwards in 1986 when talks for the Uruguay Round within GATT began – with the free market philosophies of Thatcher and Reagan leading the way for countries to reduce the barriers to international trade that were in place. The talks concluded successfully in 1994 with an agreement that reduced global tariffs on goods substantially, so boosting the volume of trade. Other key free trade agreements have been NAFTA which came into force in 1994, the development of the EU Single Market in the 80s and 90s, where Mrs Thatcher did much to drive progress.

As part of that agreement the World Trade Organisation was set up in 1995 to take over GATT’s responsibilities for matters relating to international trade. In 2001 the WTO initiated the Doha Round, at the same time as China was admitted to membership of the WTO. The accession of China to the WTO saw a further dramatic rise in global trade volumes until 2008.

In hindsight this was peak of the trade deal cycle and agreement between nations to reduce trade barriers. No significant progress has been made since then.

The aim of the Doha Round was to further reduce global trade barriers especially within agriculture and services. It had an original deadline for an agreement by 2005, but was plagued by difficulties – negotiations collapsed in Geneva in 2008 and the Global Financial Crisis has meant that since then national governments have been unwilling to make concessions that might harm their citizens.

In recent years, following the collapse of the Doha Round there have been three attempts at major non-global trade agreements. These are between (i) the US and the EU via the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) talks, launched in 2013, (ii) the US and other American and Pacific nations via the TPP (Transpacific Partnership) and (iii) Canada and the EU via the CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) talks, negotiated between 2009 and 2014.

Of these TTIP talks have got stuck – the original intention to conclude by 2014 has been extended to 2019 but across Europe there is increasing unhappiness at the secrecy of the proposals and the progress of negotiations. The TTP talks produced an agreement but requires ratification from the US – during the campaign Donald Trump has stated his opposition to this and other trade agreements and would not ratify it, and Hillary Clinton, having been a supporter of it when in government has now said that she would not ratify it. The CETA has recently run aground as EU ratification of the Treaty requires each of the 28 member states to ratify it individually and Belgium cannot do so without the agreement of the Walloon parliament, which is currently firmly opposed to doing so, seeing as a further dangerous step towards globalisation.

Trade deals have lost their political support and the momentum of the trade deal cycle is now firmly down. Though the UK and the rest of the EU ought to be able to agree on a post-Brexit trade deal given the economic benefits to both sides, for the UK to conclude many other significant trade deals is likely to be a very long and arduous process.

The UK’s post-Brexit need for free trade deals will prove to be cyclically poorly-timed and a negotiating weakness at a time when countries are growing increasingly suspicious of the benefits of such deals.

 

A hard Brexit please

This week the government made clear its decision regarding the sort of Brexit it will be seeking. The red lines of control of immigration and withdrawal from the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction represent the “taking back control” that the Leave campaign promised.

The other 27 countries in the EU have made abundantly clear that the price of Britain denying freedom of movement is that it cannot continue to be inside the single market –  the working definition of a hard Brexit. Thus some sort of agreement on how trade will be conducted between Britain and the EU will be required.

There appear to be two key areas to be negotiated before Britain actually leaves – (i) a transitional trade agreement pending a more permanent agreement which might take many years to conclude and (ii) an agreement on the financial services sector and the current passporting system.

It is interesting to note that the red lines regarding “taking back control” do not include the subject of the UK’s net contributions to the EU budget and it seems that Britain may be prepared to pay (financially) for a transitional trade agreement and agreement over continued financial services passporting. Whether this would be acceptable to the EU countries is not clear – the current payment from the UK of £18bn per year (which would presumably be the maximum that Britain would be prepared to pay), does not go very far when spread around 27 countries.

Whilst now is the time of maximum pessimism about Brexit negotiations -before formal talks have even begun and with each side setting out their red lines – Britain has lost goodwill in Europe over the last week following policy ideas announced at the Conservative Party ‘s regarding foreign-born workers.

Both Merkel and Hollande have made clear that it is important for them that Britain should be not be seen as having won anything by deciding to leave the EU, and though it is quite possible neither will be around to have much influence over the negotiations, their fellow-countrymen are unlikely to have very different ideas.

With important votes and elections in Italy, Spain, France, Netherlands and Germany over the next 12 months, little progress should be expected in the Brexit talks in that time period. This will prove negative to the world’s view of Britain – the pound has continued its post-referendum decline this week, and gilt yields have risen in anticipation of the higher inflation this is likely to create in the British economy.

International investors will at best defer further investment into the country and at worst begin making adjustments to their factory and office locations to reflect a Britain outside the single market. Any good news regarding the benefits of new trade agreements with other non-EU countries will have to await the outcome of talks to agree our relationship with the EU.

By announcing when it expects Article 50 to be triggered and its red lines, Britain has now entered a period of massive vulnerability for its economy. Maintaining the goodwill of the other EU countries should now be a key objective of foreign policy.